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Abstract
This paper analyzes the sources of the slowdown in productivity
growth in the US and other major OECD nations. It presents a medium
term structural macroeconomic model for interpreting the interdependence
between inflation, total capital formation (human, physical, and
knowledge capital), and the basic sources of labor productivity growth.
The major sources of the slowdown based primarily on a production
function estimated for 15 nations are found to be the underutilization
(labor hoarding) and reduced physical capital investment due to
restrictive monetary policies that followed the 1973 and 1979 energy and
other supply price shocks. Oversize and overactive government and
increased environmental regulation are rejected as sources after
investigation. But the loss of the advantages of backwardness (i.e.
follower countries, most notably Japan, have had an advantage in not
having to develop the basic technology), and the Baily effect (i.e.
obsolescence due to energy shocks) are the third and fourth significant
factors.
Human capital formation, measured as increased educational attain-
ment, is found to be significant to productivity growth, but the per
student cuts in real terms have come later than the onset of the
slowdown. Lower nondefense R&D effort in the US and UK relative to that
in Germany and Japan is found to be a less significant factor, although
it may operate with a longer lag.

Sources of the Slowdown In Productivity Growth:
A Structural Interpretation
Walter W. McMahon
This paper presents an analysis of the sources of the productivity
slowdown in the U.S. with comparisons to other nations. It presents a
structural interpretation of recent work by Maddison on the "Dynamics
of Productivity Growth" (1979) and Phases of Capitalist Development
(1982), as well as of the results of Denison's (1979, 1982) and
Kendrick' s (1980) analyses, that encompasses Maddison* s useful grouping
of "conjunctural" and "non-conjunctural" sources of the slowdown in
productivity growth. That is, a more explicit simultaneous equation
model is presented here that incorporates those sources related to
slack demand and low investment following the 1973 and 1979 energy
price shocks and of non-conjunctural sources related to the "loss of
the advantages of backwardness."
Both of these are important sources of the slowdown, in my opin-
ion, and consistent with some independent evidence which I will pre-
sent. But there are additional sources of productivity growth appearing
in the work by Denison (1983), Schultz (1983), and Kendrick (1980) that
are consistent with a broader concept of total capital. These include
investment in human capital, primarily via formal education and on-the-
job training, as well as investment in new knowledge-capital primarily
through investment in those types of R&D most directly related to tech-
nical change and improvements in efficiency. Some empirical evidence
consistent with these points will also be presented.
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It Is my hope that a structural interpretation of Maddison's two
key sorces augmented with this concept of total capital, will help to
provide an increasingly adequate explanation of the sources of the
slowdown as well as of some of the possibilities for resumed labor
productivity growth in the late 1980's and in the 1990's.
Sources of the Slowdown—A Structural Interpretation
Maddison's two key sources, as well as the sources developed by
Denison (1979, 1983). to whose work we owe much of what is known
about this subject, are reflected primarily through a production func-
tion. Some such production function Is the common structural frame of
reference and must be the centerpiece of any structural model dealing
with productivity growth.
The production function presented below as well as the rest of the
model to be presented later refers to the medium term, which allows
capital deepening to occur, and its rate to have some effect on produc-
tivity growth. The medium terra however also allows there to be adverse
effects on productivity growth from underutilization of human capital
(Maddison's "labor hoarding") as well as of physical capital (excess
capacity) due to slack demand. This specifies a disequilibrium model
in the sense that cautious demand management policies give rise to
stock disequilibrium (e.g., excess capacity of human and physical
capital) as well as to reduced capital deepening, all the while with
flow equilibrium in the products and money markets, in contrast to a
focus on long run steady state growth solutions.
-3-
Starting with a Cobb-Douglas production function that includes
human capital and also (disembodied) stocks of knowledge-capital con-
sistent with work by Denison (1983), Schultz (1983) and Kendrick
(19 76), taking the natural logs, and differentiating with respect to
time gives the growth rate of real Gross Domestic Product (y) as a
function of the rate of growth of the various inputs. The rate of
growth of the number of persons employed (n) may then be subtracted
from both sides under the simplifying assumption implicit in Maddison's
paper of constant returns to scale to determine the rate of growth of
output per worker. The result is the determinants of labor produc-
tivity growth as shown below in Equation (1). (The production function
from which it can be derived is shown in the Appendix.)
(1) (y-n) = YlUH K
+ Y
2
(Y/N)_
1
+ Y
3
(k-n) + Y 4 (h-n) + Y 5a
+ Y
fi
(e-n)
In the empirical estimates below, each variable is measured as the
average for five year periods (the medium term) between 19 55 and 1980,
where:
(y-n) labor productivity growth , measured for Table 1 below as the
percent rate of growth in real GDP per person employed for the
OECD nations,
U percent underutilization of human and physical capital
,
' measured below by assuming that slack demand and hence under-
utilization of both is measured by the percent unemployed, for
which data exists,
(Y/N) the initial level of output per worker at the beginning of
each new five year period—Maddison's "advantages of
backwardness ,"
(k-n) = the rate of physical capital formation (k) per worker (n) .
It is measured in Table 1 as Gross Private Domestic
Investment as a percent of base year GDP, per person em-
ployed. Gross Investment allows for the embodiment of new
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technology through replacement investment, and is consistent
with the use of GDP rather than NIPPE for y. Base year GDP
in the denominator substitutes for capital stock data (which
does not exist for many countries other than the U.S.).
(k-n) = the rate of human capital formation per worker , measured for
Table 1 as the increase in the average educational attainment
of the working age population,
a » the rate of increase in disembodied technical knowledge ,
measured for Table 1 as non-defense public and private R&D
investment at the beginning of each new five year period as
a percent of GDP in that year, and
(e-n) the rate of change in petroleum-energy use per worker ,
measured in Table 1 as the percent change in net oil imports
plus domestically produced and consumed oil per person
employed.
This offers a framework for considering and independently evaluating
the relative importance of the conjunctural and non-conjunctural forces,
the latter including human capital formation and R&D. I will discuss
the results of the various estimates of equation 1 below, starting with
the conjunctural forces which are associated with the effects of under—
utilization.
The Effects on Productivity Growth of Underutilization
But first, the fact that the slowdown in growth (and hence also in
productivity growth) has been experienced in all of the major OECD
countries since 1972 as may be seen in the top of Table 2 below is sig-
nificant because it forces attention to factors that are not unique to
the United States. The restrictive demand management policies used in
all of these nations following the 1973 and 1979 oil price shocks with
their adverse effects on capital formation per worker, (k-n) in Eq . (1)
above, and on underutilization of human and physical capital, U ,
(which includes Maddison's "labor hoarding") fill this bill, whereas
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suddenly changing patterns of union strength, management efficiency, or
government size do not.
To attempt to appraise these two conjunctival forces, consider the
regressions shown in Table 1 using equation (1). They seek to explain
productivity growth since 1955 in 15 OECD nations including the U.S. in
5 year periods, which yields 75 observations. Notice that the effect
of slack demand as measured either by the percent of unemployment (U)
or by changes in unemployment, both of which are adjusted for differences
in measurement among countries, is always a significant factor and pxcept
in an insignificant instance) always has the expected sign. This is con-
sistent with the proposition that low utilitization rates are an impor-
tant source of slow productivity growth. The rate of physical capital
formation per worker, (k-n) , also has the expected effect on produc-
tivity growth. Its significance is consistent with the proposition that
higher capital formation raised productivity prior to 1973 and lower
capital formation since that time slowed it. This result is also con-
sistent with a stress on the conjunctural forces related to cautious
demand management policies, particularly monetary policy, following the
two energy price shocks.
I must add, however, an important refinement. The lower rates of
physical capital formation per worker, and it is capital formation per
worker that is relevant to productivity growth, were also the result
in the U.S. of a large wave of new workers entering the labor force in
the 1970 's picked up by (k-n) in the regressions. This can be seen In
the data on employment in these nations. The big wave of postwar births
entering the labor force in the U.S. was not matched by comparable
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Table 1
Growth In Labor Productivity
Dependent Variable: Productivity Change Over 5 Year Period (y-n)
for Each Country
FIFTEEN OECD NATIONS :
1955-1970 1955-1980
Independent Variables: Coef. t-statlstic Coef. t-statistic
Underutilization (Av. U) -1.23 -1.52 -1.50 -2.60
Initial Productivity (Y/N) -11.23 -2.62 -10.70 -3.10
Physical Capital Deepening
(Av. I/Y^-n)
Human Capital Deepening
Y -n .81 3.38 .67 3.63
(h-n) .05 2.02 .02 1.22
Energy Charge per Worker (e-•n) .00 .38 .01 1.17
Constant (eg., Stocks of
Knowledge) .14 1.70 .16 2.32
Number of Observations = 45 75
R2 .57 .54
FIVE LARGEST OECD NATIONS:
Independent Variables:
Underutilization (Av. U)
Change in Utilization (u)
Initial Productivity (Y/N)
Physical Capital Deepening
(k-n) = (Av. I/Y, ~n)
Human Capital Deepening
(h-n)
R&D Knowledge Formation
a = (R&D) /Y -.05 -1.23 -.10 -1.09
Energy Charge per Worker
(e-n) .002 .46 .002 .25
Number of Observations 15 25
R2 = .97 .68
Simple Correlation, (y-n)
with (R&D)_
1
/Y_ .16 -.12
Coef.
1955
t-
-1970
statistic
1955-
Coef. t-
-1980
-statistic
-3.21 -1.70 1.37 .37
-3.67 -3.68 -3.67 -2.18
-6.76 -1.35 -5.01 -.49
1.01 3.45 1.67 2.29
.32 6.41 .04 .50
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increases in France, Germany, Japan, or Che U.K., where total employ-
ment remained stable in this period, with the result that the dilution
of the amount of capital per worker would operate to contribute to
relatively slower productivity growth in the U.S.
Loss of the "Advantages of Backwardness"
The second major source of the slowdown is the longer run loss of
"technological backwardness" as Europe and Japan catch up to the U.S.
It is reflected in the Initial productivity level terra in Equation (1)
and Table 1, which will also reflect the Rosenberg (1976) effect.
Rosenberg's basic idea is a reasonable one, that the process of
research, and of trial and error in Innovation, impose constraints on
the pace of development of knowledge in the lead country. This is a
burden borne by the United States that is now shifting in some product
lines to Germany and Japan.
The "advantages of technological backwardness" helps to explain a
somewhat faster growth outside the U.S., such as in Japan, where the
level of productivity was far behind that in the U.S. in 1960, as well
as somewhat slower growth In the U.S. where many of the costs of tech-
nological leadership and innovation are borne. In Table 1 the initial
productivity level representing this effect does have the expected
negative sign, and higher initial levels are significantly associated
with relatively slower productivity growth in all regressions. This
result is consistent with the conclusion that the advantages of back-
wardness are an Important factor, and that their loss can slow a
nation's labor productivity growth rate.
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Human Capital Formation
A major factor that I would like to discuss next is the signficance
of human capital formation to the productivity growth process. This
factor also appears in the work by Denison (1983), Schultz (1983), and
Kendrick (1980).
When human capital formation per worker as measured by increased
average educational attainment of the working age population is intro-
duced as shown in Equation (1), it always turns out to have the ex-
pected positive sign. It is a significant factor explaining produc-
tivity growth in the relatively stable period from 1955 to 1970. It
continues to have a positive relation to productivity growth in the
unstable period from 1970 to 1980. Of course there is some two way
joint dependence between human capital formation and per capita income
growth. But if on further investigation the simultaneous bias should
turn out to be small, this tentative estimate suggests that even this
limited measure of human capital formation accounts for a significant
fraction of the -productivity growth in the postwar period in the deve-
loped nations.
When this measure of basic literacy in mathematics and language
is augmented with a measure of the number of trained scientists and
engineers as a percent of the labor force in each industry, it ex-
plains how it is possible for the follower-county to adapt and use
effectively the new technologies. This step is essential to be able
to capitalize on the "advantages of backwardness." There are many
LDC's that have not equaled the growth record of Japan and Israel, for
-9-
example where large initial stocks of human capital and higher rates of
growth in education and health levels in both countries have undoubtedly
made it easier for them to use western technology. The level of educa-
tional attainment in Japan was not only high initially, but the rate of
increase has been considerably higher than that in the U.S. or the UK
since 1950! This seems to me to be an essential supplement to Maddison'
s
(19 79) mention of trade as the main transmission mechanism. Although
importing high technology capital goods undoubtedly transmits some
kinds of new technology, there are still significant steps before these
items, and perhaps even more important the more intangible kinds of
scientific findings (e.g., uses of hybrids in agriculture) can be made
effective in production.
This is consistent with what is being found in an increasing
number of studies of productivity growth in the less developed coun-
tries. To cite only one example, there is an interesting recent study
by Yamada and Ruttan (1980, p. 559) of the sources of productivity
growth in agriculture in 41 developed and developing countries. They
find that the number of graduates of agricultural colleges per person
employed in agriculture (which helps to facilitate the dissemination of
technology as well as mobility out of lower productivity agriculture
into agribusiness) , supplemented by the average educational attainment
of persons in agriculture, accounts for 30-32 percent of the produc-
tivity differences in agriculture among developed as well as among less
developed countries.
This is not to suggest that reduced human capital formation has
as yet been more than a minor source of the slowdown in productivity
-10-
growth. This is largely because investment in education is not as sen-
sitive to restrictive monetary policies as is physical capital invest-
ment, mostly because relatively less human capital is financed with
credit or sensitive to changes in credit terms. Nevertheless, there
is some evidence that there may be a greater reduction in the rate of
effective human capital formation than is revealed by the figures.
For example, the quality of education has fallen in the U.S. in some
respects since the late 1960's as evidenced by the reduced requirements
in high schools for courses in math and science, and the falling math
and science scores on college admission and graduate record examina-
tions. A weakening in college curricular requirements occurred in the
U.S. as well as in Japan and elsewhere at the time of the campus unrest
of the late 1960's. Furthermore, human capital formation in the form
of on-the-job training, has been sharply reduced for those unemployed
during the 1975 and 1982 recessions. Public support for education now
is being cut severely by Federal and state government budget cuts in
the U.S. All of this is likely to reduce the rate of embodiment of new
technology in the new human capital as it is formed, with effects that
although they may have been modest since the late 1960's are likely to
be more important as growth rates are computed that link 1970 to produc-
tivity levels in 1985 and beyond.
The further significance of this is that some of the key sources
of the slowdown, such as the sharp reductions in energy-intensive
investment associated with the Baily effect, are not strictly rever-
sable. The same kinds of energy-intensive investment cannot merely be
resumed. This suggests that perhaps somewhat more attention needs to
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be paid to less energy-intensive sources of productivity growth such as
human capital formation. It can be interpreted to include improvements
in the quality of management as well as the embodiment of the new tech-
nology.
Advances in Knowledge Through R&D
There are now new data on the composition of public and private
investment in R&D, some of which is summarized in Table 2. Some types
of this R&D may reasonably be viewed as more relevant to productivity
growth than other types. For example, Japan's much larger investment
as a percent of its GDP for support of adaptation of western tech-
nology relevant to agricultural productivity, industrial productivity,
and energy shown in Table 2, as well as its much smaller total public
defense R&D effort relative to that in the U.S. and U.K. could help to
partially explain slower growth in the U.S. and U.K. as well as the
shift of technological leadership to Japan in an increasing number of
product lines. The Rosenberg (1976) effect and diminishing returns to
R&D have the potential of helping to explain the slower growth in the
U.S., but not the assumption of new leadership by Japan. The explana-
tion therefore needs to be augmented, in my opinion, with the effects
of investment in some types of advances in knowledge, a second aspect
of total investment and capital. Germany's non-defense R&D effort has
even more dramatically exceeded that in the U.S. and the U.K. since
1965 (see Table 2).
Some will argue that new weapons systems and space exploration
have spillover effects on productivity growth
—
perhaps this is
Maddison's implicit assumption in looking at total R&D where the U.S.
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Table 2
Growth Rates and Composition of R&D Expenditure
Countries Ranked from Fastest (left) to Slowest (right)
Pre-Energy-Shock Growth
JAPAN GERMANY FRANCE SWEDEN U.S. U.K.
Growth Rate Per Capita:
1966-1973 9.5% 3.9% 4.9% 3.2% 2.9% 2.5%
1974-1980 1.9 2.1 2.3 .9 1.3 .7
Non-Defense Govt. R&D
Plus Pvt. R&D As a
Percent of GDP:
1965
1975
1.53% 1.53% 2.01% n.a. 1.33% 1.49%
1.89 2.19 1.80 n.a. 1.50 1.39
Government R&D by
Major Objective:
Defense
Industrial Productivity
Agricultural
Productivity
Energy
Health
Advancement of
Knowledge
Other (e.g., Space,
Telecommunication,
Environment)
5% 19% 36% 33% 49% 61%
13 15 14 3 .4 10
30 3 4 3 2 5
19 21 9 12 10 8
7 6 5 11 12 3
25 27
15
17 26 23 9.2
Sources: Non-Defense R&D from Science Indication , N.S.F., p. 212
Government R&D by Objective is net of general university
funding from Piekarz et al. (1983, Table 10).
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clearly leads. But surely those components of R&D directly oriented
to improving economic efficiency and productivity or to expanding
basic knowledge are likely to have a larger impact on productivity
growth than those that are not—see Gilpin (1975) and NSF (1981, p. 9).
Defense research also computes for scarce scientific research per-
sonnel. Beyond this, the United States devotes a larger fraction of
its non-defense research dollars to health R&D than elsewhere. There
are many non-monetary returns to health research in the form of a
longer and better quality of life for which no imputations are made in
the measures of GNP used in calculating productivity growth.
With respect to empirical evidence, total public and private
non-defense R&D—the only measure available for the 1960-1980 period,
and then only for the five largest OECD countries—has exceeded that
in the U.S. in both Germany and Japan since 1968, as can be seen in
Table 1. When it is introduced into the regression as shown at the
bottom of Table 1, its coefficient somewhat surprisingly is negative,
but it is not significant at the .05 level. The simple correlation
is positive up until 1970 however as shown in the bottom line of
Table 1, after which the more dramatic slowdown that occurred in the
high-growth countries (see the top of Table 2) is negatively corre-
lated with their higher R&D efforts. This all suggests that it is
likely that there are longer lags involved than those introduced into
this particular regression, and that better controls are needed for
the effects of underutilization. It also is likely to be fruitful to
extend Piekarz' data to measure those types of R&D expected to be more
relevant to productivity growth over the entire 1955-1980 period so
they could be used in the regressions.
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There is some empirical evidence of shifts in technological
leadership away from the U.S. The increasing number of U.S. patents
secured by foreign inventors, for example, and the decline since about
1967 in the number of patents secured by American inventors (NSF,
1981, p. 110), may also be related to the smaller nondefense R&D
effort in the U.S. This smaller effort has been due largely to the
decline in Federal support for non-defense R&D, since R&D by industry
has continued to grow slowly in real terras, in spite of the lower pro-
fits during the 1975 and 1982 recessions (NSF, 1981, p. 75).
Needed Imputations for Environmental Improvements
Turning to Maddison's and Denison's point that increased govern-
mental regulation related to better air, water, and industrial health
causes some of the slowdown in productivity growth, I would like to sug-
gest that this is largely because the National Income Accounts fail to
make imputations for the returns to better health, for example, as the
result of Improved air and water quality (via EPA regulations) and im-
proved health and safety in the mines and other industries (via OHSA
regulations) . Surely these add to utility and satisfaction as do many
other final consumer services. We count the costs of cleaning up the
environment that are added within firms by the regulations, but then
treat it as an Intermediate good and fail to count the final product.
If the product price is increased as the result of these added costs,
It adds to the inflation rate, but, (except for some consumer product
safety gadgets) , not to the quantity of final output that is measured.
Of course one mist agree with Maddison, and with Denison, that measured
productivity thereby Is lower. It is virtually true by definition.
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When I attempted some imputations for the improvement to the environ-
ment and health brought about by these regulations, based simply on
factor cost, plus imputations for the services of housewives that include
the dramatic improvement in their education that, as George Psacharopoulis
points out, contributes among other things to better health in the
family, I found no decline in growth of measured plus imputed GNP per
person employed in the period from 1965 to 1973 (see McMahon, 1981,
p. 9). Making imputations for the imputed rental value of household
capital, as well as the services of housewives, Kendrick (1979, p. 357)
found much the same pattern of increasing imputed values from 1966 to
1973. Eisner's (1982) analysis of capital formation by government
comes to much the same conclusion:—that is, imputed rental values for
government-created capital to be added to GNP that grow after 1966.
It is extremely desirable to increase the cost effectiveness of
these regulations. But since most of us have by now had experiences
such as breathing cleaner air, swimming in cleaner lakes, and observing
strip miners replacing the top soil, perhaps it is now time to leave
the burden of the proof that these regulations are totally cost-
ineffective to those who use data where they have made no imputations
for health or environment improvements, thereby valuing them at zero.
But even including some imputations for much of this imperfectly
measured final product, there is still a sharp slowdown in productivity
growth beginning not in 1966 but In 1973.
Oversized and Overactive Government
When one investigates the hypothesis that an oversized and over-
active government la impeding productivity growth and significantly
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responsible for the slowdown, one finds that total taxes as a percent
of GNP are larger in France, Austria, Greece, Belgium, and especially
in Germany, than they are in the United States, and that all of these
countries have grown faster than the United States, both postwar and
from 1973 to 1980. Among OECD countries where the government sector is
smaller, only one, Japan, has grown faster, and several, such as Spain,
Australia, and Portugal are growing more slowly. I therefore must
agree with Angus Maddison (1983); there is no apparent relationship
between government size and economic growth or labor productivity.
Enough has been said above, however, to suggest that the structure
of government expenditure and taxes can have a significant impact.
Some government expenditure is really investment, such as the invest-
ment in non-defense research and development, and investment in physi-
cal and human capital—areas where significant cuts can have an adverse
effect on the technological leadership of the nation and on produc-
tivity growth in the longer run. Conversely, some types of government
expenditure support only consumption, such as the operation of large
unfunded retirement systems or ADC-type welfare systems, which probably
operate in the other direction to reduce personal savings rates, physi-
cal capital formation, human capital formation, and measured growth.
A More Explicit Model Needed
The needed next step is the construction of a more explicit and
more comprehensive uodel that captures these major effects developed
above as well as by Maddison (1983), Denison (1983), Schultz (1983),
and Kendrick. (1980). The productivity-growth function (derived from
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the production function) in Eq. (1) above needs to be augmented with a
more complete specification of the demand-side, since the simultaneity
implicit in the effects of cautious demand management policies is also
implicit in most discussions of productivity growth. But except for a
few purely theoretical long-terra growth models, it is seldom taken
explicitly into account.
Such a model is presented in Table 3. Its theme is that slower pro-
ductivity growth and energy price shocks adversely affect the inflation
rate, that the rate of inflation is a significant influence leading to
tighter macroeconomic policies (particularly monetary policy) , and that
these in turn restrict investment demand, capital formation, and the
level of utilization of human and physical capital, all of which retard
productivity growth.
Most discussions of this subject are in terras of rates of change.
So in Table 3 I attempt to set out a consistent structural model in
rate of change terras. After the productivity growth equation (1) which
was discussed above, the inflation rate is determined through a rela-
tively standard Phillips-type reduced form price equation that is
shifted adversely by the slowdown in productivity growth. Eq. (3)
determines the rate of growth of the money supply through a reaction
function within which this inflation rate appears. Together with the
rate of growth in the demand for money in Eq. (4), the slowed growth
of the money supply has the net effect of tightening credit terras, r,
which in turn restrict gross investment in physical capital stocks in
Eq. (6). This in turn slows the rate of growth of aggregate demand
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Table 3
A Structural Interpretation of Medium-Term Productivity
Growth and of Sources of the Slowdown
Summary of the Model, Incorporating Maddison' s Sources and Total Capital
Productivity Growth;
(1) (y
g
- n) = Y.jU + Y
2
(Y/N)_
1
+ Y 3
(k-n) + Y 4 (h-n) + Y 5a + Y 6(e-n),
Y;L < 0, Y 2
<
Inflation Rate:
(2) p = S
X
U + B
2
(y-n) + 6^ + g^, e x < o, e 2 < o
Monetary Policy; (Demand Management Reactions to Inflation)
(3) m
s
= <*y
p
+ k*P + k*u < 2 <
(4) m = u.y + U
2
r + u~* U
2
<
(5) m = m = m,
s d
Total Investment;
(6) k = Q
±
y + 2
r + 0^
(7) h = S y + 5^
k = (I-IA)/Y_lf 2 = (S^Y^) <
h
- <VV /Y-r % VY-i
(8) a - e
x
y + e
2
r + e^ a - (W*.r gA - GA/Y.X
Aggregate Demand (Flow Equilibrium) and Fiscal Policy;
(9) y - c + k + h + a + q* +7- 1, g= (G-G^-G^/Y^, f -"f/Y^
(10) c = A Q
+ A
1
(y-t+r) c = (C-I^/Y^
(ID y = y
s
= yd
t = T/Y , r = R/Y^
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Table 3 (continued)
Labor Requirements, Under-employment Equilibrium and Underutilization:
(12) n = (1/Y)y - (Y
7
/Y)k n = (N-N^/N^
(13) U = (¥-N)/¥ . . ., ... , TT
p p by definition of U,
(14) U = U = U = U, a simplifying assumption.
ri | K H K
Variables are defined in the text under Eqs. (1-5) except for:
G„ government investment in human capital, and in R&D (G^), which
are netted from Government Purchases of Goods and Services
(G = (l+g*)G_!).
I = household investment in human capital, which is netted from
Personal Consumption Expenditure (C) for inclusion in h.
I = business investment in R&D, which is netted from Gross Private
Domestic Investment (I) for inclusion in a.
y = percent rate of change in real Gross Domestic Product (Y)
demanded (yn) and supplied (ys) during the medium term,
(5 year) period, with y = (Y-Y-jj/Y-i.
•
r = the real rate of interest, so that r = (l+r)r_...
•Tf = percent rate of change in the expected inflation rate.
n = percent rate of change in employment of labor demanded (nn)
and supplied (ns ) during the medium term (5 year) period.
T = total tax receipts, R transfer payments, and
U = percent underutilization of human capital (labor hoarding by
firms, Uy), physical capital (percent excess capacity) (U^)
,
raw labor unemployed (U), so that U = (l+u)U .
Greek letters are all constant-term coefficients.
Symbolizes policy-determined parameters and variables.
Overbar symbolizes exogenous variables, and for purposes of an
instantaneous (medium term) equilibrium, all lagged endogenous
variables can be regarded as predetermined.
-20-
through its effect in Eq. (9), with feedback effects reducing consump-
tion demand in Eq. (10), and the growth of employment in Eq. (12).
The resulting slack demand and unemployment shown in Eqs. (13-14),
slow the inflation rate directly via Eq. (2) as well as indirectly as
price expectations (tt) eventually readjust. But the slower income
growth and slack demand also slow total capital formation as shown in
Eqs. (6-8) and, together with the attendant underutilization, adverse-
ly affect productivity growth through Eq . (1). The result is slowed
productivity growth, and as especially in the case of Britain, can
be stagflation.
Each of these equations expressed in terms of medium term (5 year)
rates of growth has been derived (and can be derived by the reader)
from its corresponding function expressed in terms of absolute levels.
The derivations will not be shown here because of the space that would
be required (except for the derivation of the productivity growth
equation shown in the Appendix) . The only exception to such a deriva-
tion is the reduced-form Phillips equation, Eq. (2), which however has
become quite standard. The rates of change (which must be expressed
in different form a ratios such as c = C/Y, to be consistent in Eqs.
(6-11) because the aggregate demand components are additive) all are
defined here to relate to medium term (5 year) periods. Since the
model is linear, it can be solved simultaneously for a medium term (or
intermediate-term) equilibrium by treated the lagged endogenous
variables as parameters, which then determines a solution for each of
the 16 endogenous variables including these rates of change. This
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includes a solution for the rate of productivity growth in any given 5
year period.
Looked at froa an estimation point of view, its behavioral coeffi-
cients, expressed in Table 3 in Greek symbols, can be estimated by
simultaneous equation methods, regarding the lagged endogenous var-
iables (as well as the exogenous variables) as predetermined for
estimation purposes. The simultaneous equation bias that results, for
example, from the simultaneous affects of R&D on income growth, and of
income growth in turn on support for R&D, would thereby be eliminated.
The result should be a more precise measure of each effect on produc-
tivity growth in the medium term.
Much more could of course be said about this structural model and
its properties. But enough has been said above and in Table 3 to give
a clear view of the usefulness of a more explicit simultaneous equation
model both for more precise measurement and for a structural interpre-
tation of the sources of the slowdown in productivity growth.
Conclusion
In conclusion, let me summarize the sources of the slowdown in
labor productivity growth in the medium term as first, slack demand and
investment following the oil price shocks in 1973, and second the loss
of the "advantage of backwardness." Third, an important source of labor
productivity growth, if not of the slowdown, is human capital formation.
Fourth, some types of R&D such as the type of R&D that supports adap-
tation of western technology in Japan. I would only hope that to
restore growth, rather than using beggar-thy-neighbor policies, (such
-22-
as limiting scientific and social-scientific interchange) , the possi-
bilities of a broader concept of total capital and hence of total
investment in education and in R&D, irrespective of what sector does
it, would not be overlooked. Investment in primary, secondary, and
higher education and in R&D have the further advantage of being less
energy-intensive forms of investment. Combined with some energy-saving
types of investment in physical capital goods, human capital formation
and knowledge-capital formation through R&D would appear to offer
significant promise for helping to avoid stagflation while simulta-
neously aiding labor productivity growth.
References
Denison, Edward F. (1983) "Accouting for Slower Growth: An Update,"
in John Kendrick, ed. , International Comparisons of Productivity
and Causes of the Slowdown, AEI, Washington, DC.
Denison, Edward F. (1979) Accounting for Slower Growth , The Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC.
Eisner, Robert, and David Nebhut (1982) "An Extended Measure of
Government Product: Preliminary Results for the United States,
1946-1976."
Gilpin, Robert (1975) Technology, Economic Growth, and International
Competitiveness
,
Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, Supt.
of Documents, Washington, DC.
Kendrick, John (19 76) The Formation and Stocks of Total Capital
,
NBER, Columbia University Press.
Kendrick, John W. (1979) "Expanding Imputed Values in the National
Income and Product Accounts," Review of Income & Wealth , Dec,
349-363.
Maddison, Angus (1982) Phases of Capitalist Development , Oxford
University Press, Oxford and New York.
Maddison, Angus (1979) "Long Run Dynamics of Productivity Growth,"
Banca Nazlonale del Lavoro Quarterly Review , No. 128, March 1979,
3-43.
-23-
Maddison, Angus (1964) Economic Growth in the West , W. W. Norton &
Co. , New York.
McMahon, Walter W. (1981) "The Slowdown in Productivity Growth: A
Macroeconomic Model of Investment in Human and Physical Capital
With Energy Shocks," Faculty Working Paper #752, BEBR, University
of Illinois, Urbana, 1-43.
National Science Foundation (1981) Science Indicators , Report of the
National Science Board, 1981, U.S. Govt. Printing Office,
Washington, DC.
Piekarz, Rolf, Eleanor Thomas and Ronna Jennings (1973) "International
Comparisons of R&D and Government Policies," in John Kendricks
,
ed. , International Comparisons of Productivity and Causes of the
Slowdown , AEI, Washington, DC.
Rosenberg, N. (1976) Perspectives on Technology , Chapter 15, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Yamada, Saburo and Vernon W. Ruttan (1980) "International Comparisons
of Productivity in Agriculture," in John W. Kendrick and B.
Vaccara, New Developments in Productivity Measurement and
Analysis , NBER Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 44, pp. 509-94.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Appendix
The sources of productivity growth given by equation (1) in the
text may be derived from the following production function:
Y
1
U
HK
C Y
2
(Y/N)t Y
3
Y
4
Y
5
Y
6
(la) Y = e
l
e
l
N(ARK) ^H) *A °E
Terms not already defined above under equation (1) are:
Y = real GDP, e = base of natural logs,
N = employment of new labor,
A = the stock of knowledge, embodied in physical capital through
replacement (and net new) investment (A,.), in human capital
through education and on-the-job training (A„) , and dis-
embodied new research discoveries (A).
E = petroleum-energy inputs
Taking the logs:
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(lb) £nY = y Ut + Y
2
(Y/N)t + Y*nN + Y
3
UnA^«nK) +
Y, UnA^ + £nH) + Yr^nA + Y^nE
Differentiating with respect to time, and using simpler lower case
notation for percentage rates of change gives:
(lc) y - Y,U + Y
2
(Y/N) + Yn + Y
3
(a
K
-Hc
K
) + Y^^*\) + Y 5a + Y &e
Assuming constant returns to scale among the inputs,
(Id) y * 1 - 7, - y. ~Y,»n can be subtracted from both sides.j 4
Letting gross investment represent net investment plus the embodiment
of new technology (much of which occurs through replacement invest-
ment) so that k = (I/K) for example, with Y - used as a proxy to
measure K, then gives
(1) (y-n) = YjU + Y
2
(Y/N) + Y
3
(k-n) + Y 4 (h-n) + Y $a + Y 6 (e-n),
the same determinants of the rate of growth in labor productivity
shown in equation (1) in the text.
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